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Abstract
This work is based on the proposal of a deterministic randomness extractor of a random
Diffie-Hellman element defined over two prime order multiplicative subgroups of a finite
fields Fpn , G1 and G2. We show that the least significant bits of a random element in
G1 ∗G2, are indistinguishable from a uniform bit-string of the same length.
One of the main application of this extractor is to replace the use of hash functions in pairing
by the use of a good deterministic randomness extractor.
Keywords: Finite fields, elliptic curves, randomness extractor, key derivation, bilinear
sums.
1 Introduction
The shared element after a Diffie-Helmann exchange is gab ∈ G, where G is a cyclic subgroup of
a finite field. gab is indistinguishable from any other element of G under the decisionnal Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) assumption [4]. This hypothesis argues that, given two distribution (ga, gb, gab)
and (ga, gb, gc) there is no efficient algorithm that can distinguish them. However, the encryp-
tion key should be indistinguishable from a random bit string having a uniform distribution.So
we could not directly use gab as the encryption key. It is therefore of adequate arrangements to
ensure the indistinguishability of the key such as hash functions, pseudo-random functions or
random extractors.
Deterministic random extractor have been introduced in complexity theory by Trevisan and
Vadhan [17]. Most of the work on deterministic extractors using exponential sums for their
security proof work with simple exponential sums [5, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Here we introduce de-
terministic random extractors that extract a perfectly random bit string of an element derived
from the combination of two separate source.
Related work
In 1998, Boneh et al. [5] show that calculate the k-most significant bits of a secrete is also
difficult as to calculate the common secret .The authors rely on Hidden Number Problem.
Hastad et al. [14] propose random extractor based on the probabilistic Leftover Hash Lemma,
capable of removing all of the entropy random source having sufficient min-entropy. This tech-
nique and its variants, however, requires the use of hash functions and perfect random.
The particularity of these extractors is that they belong to the random oracle model. Thus,
indistinguishability can not be proven under the DDH assumption unless you add a random
oracle. However, these are considered some limitations in practice.
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In 2008, Fouque et al. [13] propose a simple extractor capable of extracting the k least signifi-
cant bits or the k most significant bits of a strong random element issued to the Diffie-Hellman
exchange on a sufficent big subgroup of Zp. They rely on exponential sums to bound the sta-
tistical distance between two variable.
In 2009, Chevalier et al. [10] also use exponential sums but bound the collision probability of
bits extracted to prove the security of the extractor.They use the Vinogradov inequality to limit
the incomplete character sums. They improve the results of Fouque by providing an extractor
capable of extracting up to two times more bits. They also feature extractor on the group of
points of an elliptic curve defined over a finite field. However, their work was limited to the
finite prime fields.
In 2011,Ciss et al. [11] extend the work of Chevalier over finite non prime fields Fpn and elliptic
curves over Fpn and more particularly on binary finite fields. They use the Winterhof inequality
to limit the incomplete character sums.
All that previous work are based on the caracter model, using single character sums. we
focus on the extraction of a random string of bits from a random element from multiple source
in particular, two source.
Our work
We proposed a deterministic random extractor under the DDH asumption, which maps two
multiplicative subgroup of a finite field to the set {0, 1}k , permitting to extract the k-least
significant bits of a random element issue of the two subgroup. We use the double exponential
sums to bound the collision probability and give a security proof of our extractor.
Organization of work
This work is organize as follow: In section 2, we recall some definition and results about ran-
domness, character sums and bilinear character sums. In section 3, we present and analyze our
randomness extractor. In section 4, we finish by giving some applications of our extractor.
2 Preliminaries
Measures of randomness In this section, we introduce some definitions and results on the mea-
surement parameters of randomness [18] and on character sums.
2.1 Measures of randomness
Definition 2.1. Guessing probability
Let X be a set of cardinality |X | and X, an X -valued random variable.
The guessing probability γ(X) of X is given by:
γ(X) = max{P [X = v] : v ∈ X}
Definition 2.2. collision probability
Let X be a finite set and X, an X -valued random variable. The collision probability of X,
denoted by Col(X), is the probability
Col(X) = Pr[X = X ′] =
∑
x∈X
Pr[X = x]2
2
Definition 2.3. Statistical distance
Let X be a finite set. If X and Y are X -valued random variables, then the statistical distance
SD(X,Y ) between X and Y is defined as
SD(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|Pr[X = x]− Pr[Y = x]|
Let UX be a random variable uniformly distributed on X and δ ≤ 1 a positive real number.
Then a random variable X on X is said to be δ − uniform if
SD(X,UX ) ≤ δ
Lemma 2.1. Relation between SD and Col(X)
Let X be a random variable over a finite set X of size |X | and ∆ = SD(X,US) be the statistical
distance between X and UX , where UX is a uniformly distributed random variable over X . Then,
Col(X) ≥ 1 + 4∆
2
|X |
Definition 2.4. Deterministic (Y, δ)-extractor
Let X and Y be two finite sets. Let Ext be a function Ext : X → Y. We say that Ext is a
deterministic (Y, δ)-extractor for X if Ext(UX ) is δ-uniform on Y. That is
SD(Ext(UX ), UY ) ≤ δ
Definition 2.5. Two-sources-extractor
Let X , Y and Z be finite sets. The function
F : XxY → Z is a two-sources-extractor if the distribution F (X,Y ) is δ-close to the uniform
distribution UZ ∈ Z for every uniformly distributed random variables X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y
2.2 Characters
Definition 2.6. Let G be an abelian group. A character of G is a homomorphism from G→ C∗.
A character is trivial if it is identically 1. We denote the trivial character by X0 or ψ0.
Definition 2.7. Let Fq be a given finite field. An additive character ψ : F
+
q → C is a character
ψ with Fq considered as an additive group. A multiplicative character X : F∗q → C is a character
with F∗q = Fq−{0} considered as a multiplicative group. We extend X to Fq by defining X (0) = 1
if X is trivial, and X (0) = 0 otherwise. Note that the extended X still preserves multiplication.
2.3 Exponential sums over finite fields
The main interests of exponential sums is that they allows to construct some caracteristic func-
tions and in some cases we know good bounds for them. The use of these caracteristic functions
can permit to evaluate the size of these sets.
We focus on certain character sums, those involving the character ep define as it follows.
Theorem 2.1. Multiplicative characters of Fq
The multiplicative characters of Fq are given by:
∀x ∈ Fq, eq(x) = e
2ipix
q ∈ C∗
Theorem 2.2. Additive characters of Fq
Suppose q = pr with p prime. The additive characters of Fq are given by
ψ(x) = ep(Tr(x)) where Tr(x) = x+ x
p + ...+ xp
n−1
is the trace of x.
3
2.3.1 Single character sums
Let p be a prime number, G a multiplicative subgroup of F∗p .
For all a ∈ Fp∗, let introduce the following notation:
S(a,G) =
∑
x∈G
ep(ax)
.
Lemma 2.2. Let p be a prime number, G a multiplicative subgroup of F∗p .
(1) if a = 0,
∑p−1
x=0 ep(ax) = p
(2) For all a ∈ F∗p,
∑p−1
x=0 ep(ax) = 0
(3) For all x0 ∈ G and all a ∈ F∗p, S(ax0, G) = S(a,G)
Proof. Follows [21], pp69-70
Theorem 2.3. Polya-Vinogradov bound
Let p be a prime number, G a multiplicative subgroup of F∗p .
For all a ∈ F∗p: ∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈G
ep(ax)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ √p
Proof. See [21] for the proof
Theorem 2.4. Winterhof bound
Let V be an additive subgroup of Fpn and let ψ be an additive caracter of Fpn. Then
∑
a∈Fpn
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈V
ψ(ax)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ pn
Proof. See [20] for the proof
2.3.2 Bilinear character sums
Let p be a prime number, G,H be two multiplicative subgroups of F∗p .
For all a ∈ Fp∗, let introduce the following notation:
S(a, (G,H)) =
∑
x∈G
∑
y∈H
ep(axy)
Lemma 2.3. Let p be prime and, G and H two subsets of F∗p. Then
max
(n,p)=1
|
∑
x∈G
∑
y∈H
(ep(nxy))| ≤ (p|G||H|)
1
2
Proof. See [6, 19]
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Lemma 2.4. For any subsets G, H of F∗pn and for any complex coefficients αx, βy with |αx| ≤ 1,
|βy| ≤ 1, the following bound holds
|
∑
x∈G
∑
y∈H
αxβyψ(xy)| ≤ (pn|G||H|)
1
2
2.4 Exponential sums over points of elliptic curves
2.4.1 Elliptic curves
Let E be an elliptic curve over Fp, p ≥ 3 defined by an affine Weieirstrass equation of the form
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (1)
with coefficients a, b ∈ Fp. It is known that the set E(Fp) of Fp-rational points of E , with the
point at infinity O as the neutral element, forms an abelian group. The group law operation is
denoted by ⊕. Every point P 6= O ∈ E(Fp) is denote by P = (x(P), y(P)). Given an integer n
and a point P ∈ E(Fp), we write nP for the sum of n copies of P
nP = P⊕ P⊕ . . .⊕ P, n copies.
2.4.2 Bilinear sums over additive character
Given two subsets P,Q of E(Fp), and arbitrary complex functions σ, v supported on P and Q
we concider the bilinear sums of additive characters.
Vσ,v(ψ,P,Q) =
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
σ(P)v(Q)ψ(x(P ⊕Q))
Lemma 2.5. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq where q = pn, with n ≥ 1 and let∑
P∈P
|σ(P)|2 ≤ R and
∑
Q∈Q
|v(Q)|2 ≤ T
Then, uniformly over all nontrivial additive character ψ of Fq
|Vσ,v(ψ,P,Q)| <<
√
qRT
Proof. See [1]
.
3 Randomness extractor
3.1 Randomness extractor in finite fields
We propose and prove the security of a simple deterministic randomness extractor for two sub-
group G1 and G2 of F
∗
q where q = p
n, with p prime and n ≥ 1. The main theorem of this
section states that the k-least significant bits of a random element in (G1, G2) are close to a
truly random group-element in {0, 1}k . Our approach is from the model based on caracter sums.
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3.1.1 Randomness extraction in Fp
Let Fp be a finite prime field such that |p| = m.
Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative subgroup of F
∗
p of order q1 (resp.q2), with |q1| = l1,
|q2| = l2.
Let UG1 (resp. UG2) be a random variable uniformly distributed on G1 (resp.G2), and k a
positive integer less than m.
Definition 3.1. Extractor fk on Fp
The extractor fk is defined as a function
fk : G1xG2 → {0, 1}k
(x1, x2) 7−→ lsbk(x1x2)
The following lemma shows that fk is a good randomness extractor.
Lemma 3.1. Let p be a m-bits prime, G1 and G2 be two multiplicative subgroups of F
∗
p of order
q1 (resp.q2), we denote |q1| = l1 and |q2| = l2.
Let UG1 (resp. UG2) be a random variable uniformly distributed on G1 (resp.G2), and k a pos-
itive integer less than m.
Let Uk be a random variable uniformly distributed on {0, 1}k
If ∆ = SD(fk(UG1 , UG2), Uk) then
2∆ ≤
√
2k
p
+
2
k
2M(log2(p))
1
2
q1q2
= 2
k+m+log2(m)−(l1+l2)
2
Proof. Since fk(x1, x2) = lsbk(x1x2), this means x1x2 = 2
ka + b or x′1x
′
2 = 2
ka′ + b′ where
0 ≤ a, a′ ≤ 2m−k et 0 ≤ b, b′ ≤ 2k − 1
Thus x1x2 − x′1x′2 = 2k(a− a′) + (b− b′) . If lsbk(x1x2) and lsbk(x′1x′2) coincide then
x1x2 − x′1x′2 = 2k(a− a′).
Let u = a− a′ thus 0 ≤ u ≤ 2m−k
Let us define K = 2k, u0 = msbm−k(p− 1),
if w = 2mwm + . . .+ 2
1w1 + 2
0w0 , z = 2
m′zm′ + . . .+ 2
1z1 + 2
0z0, and z < w then
msbk(z) < msbk(w)
Since 0 ≤ a, a′ ≤ p− 1 therefore u ≤ u0
We introduce the following notation,
S(a, (G1, G2)) =
∑
x1∈G1
∑
x2∈G2
ep(ax1x2)
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We construct the caracteristic function, 1((x1, x2), (x
′
1, x
′
2), u) =
1
p
p−1∑
a=0
ep(a(x1x2 − x′1x′2 −
Ku)), by properties (1) and (2) of Lemma 2.2.
which is equal to 1 if x1x2 − x′1x′2 = Ku mod (p) and 0 otherwise. Therefore, we can eval-
uate Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) where UG1 (resp. UG2) is uniformly distributed in G1 (resp. in G2):
Col(fk(UG1 , UG2))
=
1
(q1q2)2
|{((x1, x2), (x′1, x′2)) ∈ (G1, G2)2∃u ≤ u0, x1x2 − x′1x′2 = Ku mod (p)}|
=
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
(x1,x2)∈(G1,G2)
∑
(x′1,x
′
2)∈(G1,G2)
u0∑
u=0
p−1∑
a=0
ep(a(x1x2 − x′1x′2 −Ku))
Then we manipulate the sums, separate some terms (a = 0) and obtain:
For a = 0,
Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=0
∑
(x1,x2)∈(G1,G2)
∑
(x′1,x
′
2)∈(G1,G2)
u0∑
u=0
ep(0) =
u0 + 1
p
(*)
For a ∈ F∗p,
Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=1
∑
(x1,x2)∈(G1,G2)
∑
(x′1,x
′
2)∈(G1,G2)
u0∑
u=0
ep(a(x1x2 − x′1x′2 −Ku))
=
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=1
∑
(x1,x2)∈(G1,G2)
ep(ax1x2)
∑
(x′1x
′
2)∈(G1,G2)
ep(−ax′1x′2)
u0∑
u=0
ep(−aKu)
=
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=1
S(a, (G1, G2))S(−a, (G1, G2))
u0∑
u=0
ep(−aKu)
=
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=1
|S(a, (G1, G2))|2
u0∑
u=0
ep(−aKu)
We inject the result of (*) then,
Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=1
|S(a, (G1, G2))|2
u0∑
u=0
ep(−aKu)
We have
p−1∑
a=1
u0∑
u=0
ep(−aKu)
=
p−1∑
a=1
u0∑
u=0
ep(−au), it comes from a change of variable (a′ = Ka = 2ka mod (p), with gcd(2, p) =
1).
=
p−1∑
a=1
1− ep(−a(u0 + 1))
1− ep(−a) , considere the fact that [0, u0] is an interval, the sum is the geometric
sum.
=
p−1∑
a=1
sin(pia(uo+1)
p
)
sin(pia
p
)
= 2
p−1
2∑
a=1
sin(pia(uo+1)
p
)
sin(pia
p
)
≤ 2
p−1
2∑
a=1
1
sin(pia
p
)
≤ 2
p−1
2∑
a=1
|p
a
| ≤ p log2(p)
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Therefore
Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) ≤
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
|S(a, (G1, G2))|2p log2(p)
≤ u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
(pq1q2p log2(p)) , by Lemma 2.3
≤ 1
p
+
p log2(p)
q1q2
We now use the Lemma 2.1 which gives a relation between the statistical distance ∆ of
fk(UG1 , UG2) with the uniform distribution and the collision probability:
Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1+4∆2
2k
. The previous upper bound, combined with some manipulations,
gives:
2∆ ≤
√
2k.Col(fk(UG1 , UG2))− 1 ≤
√
2k
p
+
√
2kp(log2(p))
q1q2
≤ 2k+m+log2(m)−(l1+l2)2
3.1.2 Randomness extraction in Fpn
Consider the finite field Fpn , where p is prime and n is a positive integer greather than 1.
Fpn is a n-dimensional vector space over Fp. Let {α1, α2, . . . , αn} be a basis of Fpn over Fp.
That means, every element x and y in Fpn can be represented in the form
x = x1α1 + x2α2 + . . . + xnαn, et x
′ = x′1α1 + x
′
2α2 + . . .+ x
′
nαn. where xi (resp. x
′
i) ∈ Fpn .
Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative subgroups of F
∗
pn of order q1 (resp.q2), we denote |q1| = l1,
|q2| = l2.
Let UG1 (resp. UG2) be a random variable uniformly distributed on G1 (resp.G2), and k a
positive integer less than n.
Definition 3.2. Extractor Fk on Fpn
The extractor Fk is defined as a function
Fk : G1xG2 → {0, 1}k
(x, x′) 7−→ (x1x′1, x2x′2, . . . , xkx′k)
The following lemma shows that Fk is a good randomness extractor.
Lemma 3.2. Let p be a m-bits prime. Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative subgroups of F
∗
pn
of order q1 (resp.q2), we denote |q1| = l1, |q2| = l2.
Let UG1 (resp. UG2) be a random variable uniformly distributed on G1 (resp.G2), and k a
positive integer less than m. Let Uk be a random variable uniformly distributed on {0, 1}k
If ∆ = SD(Fk(UG1 , UG2), Uk) then
∆ ≤
√
pn+k−2
q1q2
= 2
km+nm−(l1+l2+2)
2
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Proof. Let (x, x′), (y, z) ∈ (G1, G2)2
Let us introduce the notation
T (a, (G1, G2)) =
∑
x∈G1
∑
x′∈G2
ψ(axx′)
Let us define the following sets
R = {xk+1x′k+1αk+1 + xk+2x′k+2αk+2 . . .+ xnx′nαn} , a subgroup of Fpn
C = {((x, x′), (y, z)) ∈ (G1, G2)2/∃r ∈ R,xx′ − yz = r}
|C| = 1
pn
∑
x∈G1,x′∈G2
∑
y∈G1,z∈G2
∑
r∈R
∑
a∈Fpn
ψ(a(xx′ − yz − r))
we can evaluate the collision probability:
Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
|C|
|G1xG2|2
=
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
(x,x′)∈(G1,G2)
∑
(y,z)∈(G1,G2)
∑
r∈R
∑
a∈Fpn
ψ(a(xx′ − yz − r))
=
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
a∈Fpn
∑
(x,x′)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(axx′)
∑
(y,z)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(−ayz)
∑
r∈R
ψ(−ar)
Then we manipulate the sums, separate some terms (a = 0) and obtain:
For a = 0
Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
a∈Fpn
∑
(x,x′)∈(G1,G2)
∑
(y,z)∈(G1,G2)
∑
r∈R
ψ(0) =
1
pk
For a ∈ F∗pn
Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
a∈F∗
pn
∑
(x,x′)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(axx′)
∑
(y,z)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(−ayz)
∑
r∈R
ψ(−ar)
Then for all a ∈ Fpn
Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1
pk
+
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
a∈F∗
pn
∑
(x,x′)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(axx′)
∑
(y,z)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(−ayz)
∑
r∈R
ψ(−ar)
Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1
pk
+
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
a∈F∗
pn
|T (a, (G1, G2))|2
∑
r∈R
ψ(−ar)
Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2)) ≤
1
pk
+
pn(q1q2)p
n
(q1q2)2pn
, by Lemma 2.4 and Theorem 2.4
Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2)) ≤
1
pk
+
pn
(q1q2)
We now use the Lemma 2.1 which gives a relation between the statistical distance ∆ of
Fk(UG1 , UG2) with the uniform distribution Uk and the collision probability:
Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1+4∆2
2k
.
2∆ ≤
√
2k.Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2))− 1
∆ ≤
√
pn+k
4q1q2
≤
√
pn+k
22q1q2
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∆ ≤
√
pn+k−2
q1q2
Therefore with some manipulations, we obtain the expected result:
∆ ≤
√
pn+k−2
q1q2
= 2
km+nm−(l1+l2+2)
2
3.2 Randomness extraction in elliptic curves
3.2.1 Randomness extractor in E(Fp)
Definition 3.3. Let p be a prime greater than 5. Let E be an elliptic curve over the finite field
Fp and let P,Q be two subgroups of E(Fp). Let denote |P| = q1 and |Q| = q2.
Then is define the function
extrack : PxQ → {0, 1}k
(P,Q) 7−→ lsbk(x(P).x(Q))
Lemma 3.3. We now show an equivalent of Lemma 3.1
Let E be an elliptic curve over the finite field Fp and let P,Q be two subgroups of E(Fp). Let
denote |P| = q1 and |Q| = q2. Let UP and UQ be two random variables uniformly distributed in
P and Q respectively. Let Uk be the uniform distribution in {0, 1}k. Then
∆(extrack(UP , UQ), Uk) <<
√
2k−2p log2(p)
q1q2
= 2
k+n+log2(n)−(l1+l2+2)
2
Proof. Let us define K = 2k, u0 = msbm−k(p − 1)
Define the characteristic function
1((P,Q), (A,B), u) =
1
p
∑
ψ∈Ψ
ψ(x(P)x(Q) − x(A)x(B) −Ku) which is equal to 1 if ψ = ψ0 and
to 0, otherwise.
Let us compute the collision probablity
Col(extrack(UP , UQ)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
ψ∈Ψ
∑
u≤u0
ψ(x(P)x(Q) − x(A)x(B) −Ku)
Then we manipulate the sums, separate some terms (ψ = ψ0) and obtain:
Col(extrack(UP , UQ)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ∈Ψ
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
ψ(x(P)x(Q) − x(A)x(B) −Ku)
For (ψ = ψ0),
Col(extrack(UP , UQ)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
ψ0(0)
=
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
ep(Tr(0))
=
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
1
=
u0 + 1
p
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For (ψ 6= ψ0),
Col(extrack(UP , UQ)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
ψ(x(P)x(Q) − x(A)x(B) −Ku)
Then
Col(extrack(UP , UQ)) =
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
ψ(x(P)x(Q)−x(A)x(B)−
Ku)
=
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
ψ(x(P)x(Q))
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
ψ(−x(A)x(B))
∑
u≤u0
ψ(−Ku)
=
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
|
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
ψ(x(P)x(Q))||
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
ψ(−x(A)x(B))|
∑
u≤u0
ψ(−Ku)
=
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
|V(ψ,P,Q)|2
∑
u≤u0
ψ(−Ku)
≤ 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
q1q2p
∑
u≤u0
ψ(−Ku), by Lemma 2.5
≤ 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
pq1q2p log2(p), since it is shown that
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
∑
u≤u0
ψ(−Ku) ≤ p log2(p)
≤ 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)
p log2(p)
We now use the Lemma 2.1
2∆(extrack(UP , UQ), Uk) <<
√
2k.Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2))− 1
2∆(extrack(UP , UQ), Uk) <<
√
2k(
1
p
+
1
(q1q2)
p log2(p)− 1)
Therefore with some manipulations,
∆(extrack(UP , UQ), Uk) <<
√
2k−2p log2(p)
q1q2
= 2
k+n+log2(n)−(l1+l2+2)
2
3.2.2 Randomness extractor in E(Fpn)
Definition 3.4. Let p be a prime, p > 5. Let E be an elliptic curve over the finite field Fpn. let
P,Q be two subgroups of E(Fpn). Let denote |P| = q1 and |Q| = q2.
Then is define the function
Extrack : PxQ → {0, 1}k
(P,Q) 7−→ lsbk(x(P).x(Q))
Where x(P).x(Q) = t1α1 + t2α2 + t . . . + tnαn
Lemma 3.4. Let E be an elliptic curve over the finite field Fpn and let P,Q be two subgroups of
E(Fpn). Let denote |P| = q1 and |Q| = q2. Let UP and UQ be two random variables uniformly
distributed in P and Q respectively. Let Uk be the uniform distribution in {0, 1}k. Then
∆(Extrack(UP , UQ), Uk) <<
√
pn+k
4q1q2
= 2
km+nm−(l1+l2+2)
2
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Proof. Using Lemma 2.5 and Theorem 2.4, the sketch of the proof is the same as those of
Lemma 3.2
4 Application
The first most well-known and use tools for the extraction phase of a key exchange protocol in
order to create a secure chanal are hash function. Hash functions are the most aften adopted
solution because of their flexibility and efficiency. However, they have a significant drawback.
That is, the validity of this technique holds in the random oracle model only.
Definitely the truncation of the bit-string of the random element is the most efficient randomness
extractor, since it is deterministic and does not require any computation.
The interest of studying randomness extraction has several cryptographic applications specially
the randomness extraction from a point of elliptic curve. Some of these various applications
are find as we have already said in key derivation function, key exchange protocols[12], design
cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator[16].
Today the trend is towards cryptography identification and pairing on elliptic and hyperelliptic
curves are widely used in this field, especially for key exchange between three entities and for
authentication. Nevertheless, we find that the tools used in most of the protocols based on
the pairing, in this case for authentication using hash functions in the extraction phase. The
extractor on two sources would be good candidates to replace these functions. They are not
only deterministic but also offer the possibility of increasing the randomness considering either
one but two sources.
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